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RECENT DECISIONS
Taxation -Related Transactions and the Taxable Year-Tax-
payers, in the years 1937 through 1940, received liquidating dividends
from the corporation of which they were the sole stockholders. In 1944
they paid a judgment which had been rendered against the liquidated
corporation. The taxpayers deducted the judgment paid in 1944 as an
ordinary loss. The Commissioner contended that the 1944 payment was
a part of the original liquidating transaction and so should have been
given capital loss treatment. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer.'
However, the Second Circuit agreed with the Commissioner and held
the 1944 payment to be a capital loss.2 Held, with three justices dissent-
ing: Affirmed. The liability of the taxpayers on the judgment resulted
from their being transferees of the corporation. This liability was di-
rectly traceable to the corporate liquidation. For the purposes of deter-
mining the nature of the 1944 payment, it is proper to view the 1937
through 1944 transactions as a whole. This in no way violates the
established principle that each tax year is a separate unit for tax pur-
poses. Arrowsmith et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 73 S.Ct.
71 (1952).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took a position directly
opposite to the rule of the principal case in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Switlik.! That case held that for the purposes of deter-
mining the tax treatment to be given a tax deficiency paid by the stock-
holders of a liquidated corporation, the payment had to be considered
a separate transaction and not a part of the original liquidation. This
decision was based on the court's finding that while the corporate liqui-
dation was, so far as these taxpayers were concerned, a sale or exchange
of a capital asset, the later payment of the tax deficiency assessed
against the liquidated corporation was not such a transaction.
The origin of the controversy here involved seems to have been the
U. S. Supreme Court decision of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,4
which first enunciated the principle in tax law now referred to as the
theory of the single year as the unit of taxation. In that case the tax-
payer in 1920 received payment for work under a contract which work
was performed from 1913 through 1915. The taxpayer failed to include
this payment in its tax return for the year 1920. The taxpayer's theory
was that since operations in 1913 and 1915 resulted in a net loss, the
payment in question was not taxable because under the Sixteenth
Amendment and the Internal Revenue Act then in force, a tax only on
115 T.C. 876 (1950).
2 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bauer, et al., Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Vivian, 193 F.2d 734 (2nd Cir. 1952).
3184 F.2d 299 (3rd Cir. 1950).
4282 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 150, 75 L. Ed. 383 (1931).
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net income or profits was contemplated. The court completely rejected
the taxpayer's contention and held that inasmuch as taxation is neces-
sarily based on fixed accounting periods, the payments received by the
taxpayer in 1920 were income for that year. Because the payments in-
volved were not a return of capital investment, they had to be examined
alone and not in conjunction with any transactions which had taken
place in prior years.
The following year the U. S. Supreme Court applied the same
reasoning in the North American Oil Case.5 There, the payments in-
volved, though received by the taxpayer under a claim of right, could
possibly have had to be returned as the result of pending litigation. The
court reasoned that even if the taxpayer had to refund the sum in ques-
tion in a later year, it would receive the benefit of a deduction in the
year when such repayment was made.'
It appears, on the other hand, that this reasoning does not neces-
sarily forbid the examination of prior transactions for all purposes. In
the same year that the U. S. Supreme Court decided the Sanford &
Brooks Co. Case,7 it recognized that there are instances where a trans-
action, by its nature, is not a closed one, and therefore it may be neces-
sary to examine the events which took place over a period of several
years in order to properly determine the tax treatment to be given a
particular payment arising out of such a transaction. The court, in
deciding the Logan Case,' was dealing with a situation involving a sale
or exchange of a capital asset. In dealing with capital assets our tax
laws first allow a taxpayer to recoup his capital investment before being
liable for any income tax. Because there may be instances where it is
impossible to determine at what exact point the taxpayer has recovered
his capital investment, it may become necessary to examine transactions
over a period of several years and to consider them as a unit.
Then, in 1943 in Dobson v. Commissioner,9 the court applied reason-
ing similar to the Logan Case1 9 and went on to point out by way of
dicta that the Sanford & Brooks Case suggested its own distinction in
that it dealt with a transaction which was not the sale or exchange of a
capital asset.21
Therefore, it has become apparent that the rule of the Sanford &
Brooks Case does not prevent the reconsideration of transactions which
by their nature are not closed. In the light of this conclusion, it can be
5 North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613, 76 L.
Ed. 1197 (1932).
6 Ibid.
7 Supra, note 4.8 Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 51 S.Ct. 550, 75 L. Ed. 1143 (1931).
9 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L. Ed. 248 (1943).16 Supra, note 8.
11 Supra, note 9.
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said that the rule of the principal case is logical and consistent with the
principle of the single year unit in taxation as expressed by the Sanford
& Brooks Case. It also appears that this rule affords a more realistic
tax treatment where this type of transaction is involved because there
is not an artificial severing of the connection between these interrelated
transactions which would be required by the rule of the Switlik Case.
Certainly to this extent, it may be said that the rule of the principal case
is fair to both the taxpayer and the government.
HARoLD M. FRAuEoNDoRER
Damages-Similarity of Rule as to Damages in Automobile Acci-
dent and Defrauded Vendee Cases-Plaintiff brought action to re-
cover damages for alleged fraud in connection with the sale of a pre-
fabricated house which sold for $6500.00. Testimony of a building con-
tractor placed the estimated value of the house, if it were as repre-
sented, between $6500.00 and $7,000.00; its estimated value at the
time of the suit, between $4,000.00 and $4500.00. The contractor also
testified that the house could be repaired and brought up to the value
it would have had, had it been as represented, for $1700.00. The trial
court entered an order granting a new trial unless the plaintiff would
elect to take judgment on the sum of $1700.00, considered by the court
as the lowest possible amount a jury could return as damages, instead
of the $3,000.00 awarded by the jury. Plaintiff appealed. Held:
$2,000.00 was the least amount to which the verdict should have
been reduced. Order reversed unless plaintiffs consented to accept-
ance of judgment for $2,000.00. Kimball v. Antigo Bldg. Supply Co.,
333 Mich. 423, 53 N.W. 2d 315 (1952).
In deciding the case the court based its decision as to damages
upon the rule that a defrauded vendee, by way of damages, is entitled
to the difference between the value of the thing as represented and
its actual value. Purporting not to decide the question as to the ad-
*missibility of evidence of cost of repairs in determining damages, the
court expressly refused to accept the supposed dual method of deter-
mining damages normally used iii automobile negligence cases, i.e.,
reasonable cost of repair or difference in value, as advocated by the
defendant and advanced in the dissenting opinion.
A defrauded vendee has several alternatives in bringing suit.
"He may elect to affirm the transaction and sue for the benefits
to which he is entitled thereunder or for damages for deceit.
On the other hand, he may elect to disaffirm the contract, fre-
quently doing so by electing to rescind and be restored to his
former position, recovering money paid out or recovering prop-
erty, and in very many cases invoking the aid of a court of
19531
